year end approaching: bonus time?
By Denis on Saturday 7 November 2009, 16:53 - Permalink
The (now) Chartered Institute for Securities & Investments has published a "position paper" on the core principles for a bonus policy.
I do appreciate the CISI does not leave the bonus debate to the public anger. Because the anger is always counter-productive and often misguided:
- I'm afraid very few French commentators being
sarcastic about ex-traders starting more society-conscious jobs are themselves great about the society around them. Not working at understanding situations is not a sign of great conscience or ethics. I don't think blaming traders for "losing" 20% of the value of a life-insurance portfolio is a sign of great conscience: I strongly suspect the buyer of the service would have achieved much worse, in a market crashing more than 20%, so (sorry but, yes,) the asset manager did probably bring value to his investments. I also strongly suspect the buyer of the service would have sold his portfolio at the top of the market if he had foreseen the crisis, so he would not have been any more a "responsible" "long-term" investor than his asset manager;
- Most people want to spend a lot, save little, minimally contribute to
pensions, but nonetheless want their savings to perform at ludicrous return
yields (so they can retire early and keep the high-spending
lifestyle!). They then refuse considering they're the ones requesting traders
and asset managers to squeeze the workers of public companies into
high-pressured low-salaries jobs under threats of globalisation and
costs-cutting. It was interesting to see a French
comment explaining that paying bonuses allows financial institutions to forget about ethics (or, more precisely, to push back ethical responsibilities on the highly paid individuals). This was an excellent point, but it forgets that institutions do not exist really outside of human investors and clients. Investors and clients all ask ridiculous returns (which require ridiculous risks (stop dreaming of a risk-free martingale!)) but blame scapegoat "traders" if things turn bad. Most commentators conveniently forget their own greed (e.g. in relation to their, unrealistically thin, pension savings) and denial-through-fees of ethical responsibilities. I don't hear a lot the commentators on the fact they're paid hundreds times more than some Chinese or Indian fellow human beings making their shoes and clothes but the same writers are outraged that some banking managers make hundreds times more than they do; that's jealousy, not a call for justice!
Back to CISI principles on bonuses. While I clearly agree to such principles,
they unfortunately do not cover stupid excesses so they're only minimum
requirements. Maybe a maximum ratio between the highest and the lowest paid
individual of a company should be mandatory? Even a fantastic CEO needs clean
toilets to conceive great strategies (and not to lose time planning how to
reach cleaner toilets in a public place nearby). Or maybe a maximum ratio
between bonus and basic salary? Or maybe, as proposed by another
commentator, treating bonuses (beyond a socially-acceptable threshold) as
"gifts" from the shareholders to the employees? This would attract specific tax
treatments, would avoid linking social benefits to socially-unacceptable
"salaries," would require explicit action from shareholders... Allow bonus up
to e.g. 100% of basic salary... then pay dividends and attach a form
so that shareholders can give a gratuity to the workers (like in
restaurants...). Finally ensure rules so that not all gratuities end in the
hand of top managers doing zero thinking on strategy and devoting all their
time to internal politics, personal investments and golf to maximize their next
cashflow (oh, sorry, did you still believe it ended in traders' hands?).
To finish, I'm afraid the flawed dominant line of thought has been followed by the CISI, in its principle 8: (...) the higher the bonus award, the greater the proportion which should be paid in shares. This ensures that the objectives of the individual are aligned with the shareholders and encourages a long-term approach. While I consider that employees' interests should align with shareholders' interests (and on such basis may agree that bonuses could be paid in shares and retained for some time), I'm afraid I remain to be convinced that shareholders take a long-term approach. As many people suddenly feel experts in asset bubbles (ex post the crisis, obviously), let's use "bubble" arguments:
- stock markets have repeatedly experienced bubbles. A big driver of such bubbles has repeatedly been the same: shares go up irrespectively of the fair-valuation of their expected future dividends (the internet years comes to mind as the clearest example), investors buy to "ride the wave," such buying orders make the shares go up hence attract more investors in search for a profit... This is circular, the point though is that shareholders buy share of which the price is going up. They do so for a short term profit, not a long-term family-business-type investment. If investors believe the prices will go down before going up, they do not buy, they wait for a "bargain" later (hence depressing the market and helping it collapse). Investors enter the market based on short-term views;
- investors may rationally buy just to "ride the wave," i.e. they might see the bubble but nonetheless hope to exit before it implodes (participating in a bubble can be rational if you believe this)... The longer the ride, the more numerous those who convince themselves, and others, that the ridiculous valuations have some sense in some context of some extraordinary game-changing growth with no risk. In any case, "following the trend" is a very common investment strategy, but it has nothing to do with shareholders showing a long-term approach: investors exit the market based on short-term views;
- to sum up, investors look for bargains and wait for the market to bottom; they also attempt selling their holdings at the top; in all cases, they do so with short-term views. I know of no shareholder with a long-term goal who would keep the shares in the short term if (s)he knew the price was to go down by 20% in the next month: any one would sell the shares, wait one month, buy them back: that would still be long-term investment in shares, but with short-term-optimised returns...
George Soros, one of the most recognised investor on the planet, said
nothing else in his call for financial
reform late October in the Financial Times.
Comments
I wonder when people will stop saying or writing stupidities on keeping talents. When French president said in August (ahead of G20 summit in Pittsburgh) "From now on, France will give no mandates to banks that don't apply (the) rules" agreed to by French bankers that include a three-year deferral on two-thirds of bonus payments, some replied "If the best and most qualified bankers go to places where they are compensated for their work, it means that Sarkozy will be doing business with only those that don't have the highest degree of excellence." That is so misguided.
The ultra-vast majority of people work only to have more than their neighbours (or people they know). It's always about showing off. By how much is of little importance, one only needs to be richer than its peers, one only needs to create envy. People fight the exact same way for £10,000 or £1,000,000 more than the guy seating next to them. If it's really hard to get £10,000 more, then this sum represents a lot of success! Of course, if money is distributed in large sums lightly and without serious considerations (as it is today), then people fight for ridiculously large amounts... but it doesn't have to be that way. Finally, it is ridiculous to believe that French bond issues need the really best bankers of the planet... Selling bonds requires access to investors and most of them will not limit themselves to only one banker, be it the best, to keep counterparty risk manageable (Lehman, anyone?) and to avoid implicitly disclosing all their strategies and become vulnerable to front-running or liquidity squeeze. Selling bonds also requires paying adequate interests for the risk perceived by investors. But, with organised markets, sovereign debt can trivially be calibrated to investors' appetite at any moment. France is not a bad counterparty needing extra efforts to locate potential buyers, so France clearly does not need the best. Almost any banker worth its salt can sell French bonds. Why pay a fortune to the guy who does?
Je pense avoir déjà rejeté plusieurs arguments de Mr Ugeux dans des billets précédents, mais par souci d'exaustivité signalons son
plan pour résoudre
le problème des bonus.
Maybe one reform for 2010:
Pressure on banks to
reveal pay over £1m, anonymously, as number of people per bands of £5m.
Obviously, there is no reason why this should apply only to banks. All
shareholders of all companies should care about such compensations
distribution. But banks are a good starting point.
This may have fun consequences for Goldman Sachs if this was to become a worldwide reform. The general public might start understanding that, when
Lloyd Blankfein defends
employees’ pay and that rumors circulate of an average of $650,000 in
compensation to each of GS's 30,000 employees, this actually hides one of the
most outrageous (top earner / bottom earner) ratio of the industry.
When Lloyd Blankfein
declare that Goldman Sachs pays its
employees more than other financial groups because its employees are more
productive, he's rating his personal productivity outstandingly
high.
While ECB's
Trichet warns on bankers’ bonuses,
Sarkozy is accused of picking
easy target after announcing a plan to follow the windfall tax in the
U.K.
While some bloggers and traders are stupid enough to believe that delaying payments until April will be enough to avoid the 50% levy the Larbour government has decided on bonuses (which prove they comment before even reading the official pre-budget report available online), real tax professionals, i.e.
lawyers, search for loopholes in
the supertax. Indeed, the wording is so inclusive and anti-evasion that
fears over reach of UK bonus
‘supertax’ spreading to non-banks and non-UK-business emerge. Still in
their bubble in spite of a recent
study claiming top bankers
destroy value, some traders just hope that
banks will absorb the supertax
cost instead of reducing bonuses to keep total costs constant (or reduce
even further, to just increase capital). This is the comeback of the
self-referential practise Trichet was talking about: because supposedly banks
cannot let talent go for better-paying competitors, they "have to" pay a
fortune to all bankers... for fear of an exodus.
I don't believe in such exodus, many people talk about it and about creating their own hedge funds, but when the time will come to leave the cosy banking system (with pension, health insurance, various perks, bonuses even on bad years) for the self-employed status with no cover, maybe 0.1% will actually keep moving forward. Others will back down. While there is nothing wrong with holding onto what one has created, it's ridiculous to shout "I'm leaving, I'm leaving" when one is not.
analysis, which says no different.
Executives say the tax, though short-term, could be a decisive factor in turning executives and companies away from the City of London and towards rival centres such as New York, Hong Kong and Singapore? This is obviously self-serving. Moving to other tax-friendly locations? Switzerland is often cited but the cost of life is very high... One needs to be already very rich for the tax benefit to be greater than the increase in cost of life. Not everybody wants to go to Dubai (although I guess real estate is really cheap at the moment there... and tax rate is still 0%), Bahrain, or even Hong-Kong either... Megan Murphy wrote in the FT her
To add to the current chaos,
EU leaders urge IMF to
consider Tobin tax.
It seems the public and their governments agree with what Dr Jan Toporowski wrote to the FT: on initial consideration, no one would like to see London deprived of all that talent and ambition that will now be driven by oppressive taxation into exile (...) But if that talent and ambition is so unique and crucial to the financial model that has crashed in London, then infecting competing financial centres with the germs of our failure may be a way of restoring our lead in world financial markets. One only has to consider how much of our “best and brightest” was poached away by Dubai to realise that it can be a highly effective strategy for London.
Elsewhere, that had to come, one day or another: Goldman is now sued,
accused of
"blindly" rewarding executives "for corporate performance that has absolutely
nothing to do with the skill of the company's employees."
News are developing extremely fast these days on this topic:
For a start, it's now official, the
French government backs
bonus windfall tax, similar to the U.K. tax.
Obviously, French banks that previously agreed to restrictions on bonuses earlier this year now complain. The interesting perspective is: they should have restricted the bonuses due to the windfall tax alone (putting the bailout-based profits to a "better" use (capital) than paying tax). That's the incentive Darling wanted to create by a one-off tax. The fact that they previously agreed to restrictions should not change anything, assuming the restrictions were meaningful and enacted... So if banks complain, does this mean they agreed to some face-saving exercise earlier, not to actual restrictions?
This is smart move from the French government though. Alistair Darling is not getting the influence he wanted to have with his tax: banks appear more and more likely to keep bonuses unchanged (the cost then being for shareholders, with a reduced profitability and dividend). The French government might have got some influence on bonus (albeit limited), as well as the tax. Meanwhile,
Darling keeps urging
restraint on bonuses, while financiers keep "warning" that
politicians are close to
tipping the City over the edge conveniently forgetting the collective
failure. How can financiers still complain it does not seem to matter if
you work in the back office controlling risk or as a trader taking the
risk, when it is obvious that controllers failed as much as risk takers?
The fact controllers are usually less paid is not an excuse not to control or
make enough noise to be heard, is it?
I don't see it coming anytime soon. I have a decent "network" in banking now, and the news is consistent: 1. stupid "politicians" knowing nothing about banking get top jobs and are well paid while more nerdy people who actually understand what's going on are not promoted. Surely, telling the truth doesn't help making friends all the time. 2. The best way to get a bonus is to be friend with your boss and co-invest with him in tax-efficient schemes (read: tax evasion, tax avoidance or tax loophole); the fact you don't manage your trading book properly doesn't matter because the boss needs you to have money to invest so you'll get paid. 3. Bosses keep closing their eyes on trading out of mandate, or they even invent a mandate: you're an exotic trader, there is a statistical arbitrage team but you don't have much business? Your boss might decide you now have a statistical arbitrage mandate within the exotic team. That's nonsense at the organisation level but, as long as you make money, you can be sure it's not a problem...
John Plender's analysis in the FT
Banking: Rarely pointed finger bluntly stated in relation
to bonuses: The managers are clearly running the banks in their own
interest, not the shareholders’. While I agree when I see managers doing
little or nothing and paid millions, the difficulty is in measuring at which
moment remuneration is too much. That
Compensation ratios
become latest jargon is probably bad news, because it is a caricature.
Banking is a capital industry, it's also primarily service-based. If you look
at software companies, the vast majority of costs will be in paying
developpers, consumer support functions (documentation, hotlines), and the
administration of the whole. You might have some hardware costs and legal costs
(patenting, defending patents...) but, overall, one would expect ultra high
compensation ratios. Historically, investment banks set aside a hefty
proportion of their net revenues – typically between 45 and 65 per cent – to
pay staff before calculating profits or paying out dividends to
shareholders. Fair enough, but so what? This is expected in a service
industry. The question is: why pay several tens of millions to top guys who
don't even know the risk their firm is running? It is not about a total
compensation ratio, because this number is biased by highly-paid
null-productivity "chief" something. I find statements like "Goldman may
have cut its ratio to 36 per cent, but that still means that it paid staff more
than $16bn (£10.2bn) in salary and bonuses in 2009, up nearly 50 per cent from
2008. That works out at about $500,000 for each of its 30,000 employees."
hugely misleading because although the average definitely is half-a-million,
the median is lower... The average is biased by a few (self-proclaimed) "top
performers" earning multiple-tens of millions, which then means thousands of
employers are paid much less than the average... but the general population
still believe working in banking is a garanteed jackpot. I am all in favour of
discussing compensation in financial services, but the debate should be
meaningful if we want it to lead to a reasonable conclusion.
Excerpt from the Poverty and inequality in the UK: 2009 executive summary:
excerpt from page 20 (27 of the PDF): Beyond the 85th percentile point, income growth is generally increasing in income [i.e. the richer you are, the even more richer you become], with a spike at the 98th and 99th percentile points[i.e. top executives and... bankers]. In previous years, we have pointed to the growth in the very top incomes as one driver of continued income inequality growth in recent years. Without calling for it, I must say I won't be surprised the day we end up with a new revolution (1789 for France) because too few have it all and too many cannot eat properly.